Many sensor networks (especially networks of mobile sensors or networks that are deployed to monitor crisis situations) are deployed in an arbitrary and unplanned fashion. Thus, any sensor in such a network can end up being adjacent to any other sensor in the network. To secure the communications between every pair of adjacent sensors in such a network, each sensor x in the network needs to store n − 1 symmetric keys that sensor x shares with all the other sensors, where n is an upper bound on the number of sensors in the network. This storage requirement of the keying protocol is rather severe, especially when n is large and the available storage in each sensor is modest. Earlier efforts to redesign this keying protocol and reduce the number of keys to be stored in each sensor have produced protocols that are vulnerable to impersonation, eavesdropping, and collusion attacks. In this paper, we present a fully secure keying protocol where each sensor needs to store (n + 1)/2 keys, which is much less than the n − 1 keys that need to be stored in each sensor in the original keying protocol. We also show that in any fully secure keying protocol, each sensor needs to store at least (n − 1)/2 keys.
which keys they have in common, then use a combination of their common keys as a symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt their exchanged data messages. Clearly, this protocol can probabilistically defend against eavesdropping.
Unfortunately, the probabilistic keying protocol suffers from the following problem. The stored keys in any sensor x are independent of the identity of sensor x and so these keys cannot be used to authenticate sensor x to any other sensor in the network. In other word, the probabilistic protocol cannot defend against impersonation.
In the grid keying protocol [5] [6] [7] [8] , each sensor is assigned an identifier which is the coordinates of a distinct node in a two-dimensional grid. Also each symmetric key is assigned an identifier which is the coordinates of a distinct node in twodimensional grid. Then a sensor x stores a symmetric key K iff the identifiers of x and K satisfy certain given relation. When two adjacent sensors need to exchange data messages, the two sensors identify which keys they have in common then use a combination of their common keys as a symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt their exchanged data messages.
The grid keying protocol has two advantages (over the probabilistic protocol). First, this protocol can defend against impersonation (unlike the probabilistic protocol) and can defend against eavesdropping (like the probabilistic protocol). Second, each sensor in this protocol needs to store only O(log n) symmetric keys, where n is an upper bound on the number of sensors in the network.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the grid keying protocol is vulnerable to collusion. Specifically, a small gang of adversarial sensors in the network can pool their stored keys together and use the pooled keys to decrypt all the exchanged data messages in the sensor network.
This situation raises the following important questions: Is it possible to design a keying protocol, where each sensor stores less than n − 1 symmetric keys and yet the protocol is deterministically secure against impersonation, eavesdropping, and collusion?
In this paper, we show that the answer to this question is yes. In particular, we present a new keying protocol where each sensor stores only (n + 1)/2 symmetric keys, and yet the protocol is deterministically secure against impersonation, eavesdropping, and collusion. We also show that this new protocol is near optimal by showing that each sensor, in any keying protocol that is deterministically secure against impersonation, eavesdropping, and collusion, needs to store at least
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Sensor networks and adversaries
In this paper, we investigate a sensor network whose topology is not planned in advance, prior to the deployment of the network. Thus, when the network is deployed, any sensor can end up being adjacent to any other sensor in the network.
(There are many occasions when a sensor network needs to be deployed before its topology can be planned in great detail. For example, when a wildfire breaks out unexpectedly, a sensor network that monitors the fire may need to be deployed in a hurry, before the network topology can be planned accurately. A second example, when a sensor network is deployed in a battlefield whose perimeter is continuously changing, the topology of the network cannot be determined fully until the time when the network is to be deployed. As a third example, if the deployed sensor network is mobile, then a detailed plan of the initial topology may be of little value.)
In this network, when a sensor x is deployed, it first attempts to identify the identity of each sensor adjacent to x, then starts to exchange data with each of those adjacent sensors.
Any sensor z in this network can be an ''adversary'', and can attempt to disrupt the communication between any two legitimate sensors, say sensors x and y, by launching the following two attacks:
1. Impersonation attack: Sensor z notices that it is adjacent to sensor x while sensor y is not. Thus, sensor z attempts to convince sensor x that it (z) is in fact sensor y. If sensor z succeeds, then sensor x may start to exchange data messages with sensor z, thinking that it is communicating with sensor y.
Eavesdropping attack:
Sensor z notices that it is adjacent to both sensors x and y, and that sensors x and y are adjacent to one another. Thus, when sensors x and y start to exchange data messages, sensor z can copy each exchanged data message between x and y.
To defend against these two types of attacks, sensors x and y need to share a symmetric key, denoted by K x,y or K y,x . The shared key K x,y needs to be known only to both sensors x and y, and not to any other sensor in the network, before these two sensors are deployed in the network. In Sections 4 and 5, we show how sensors x and y can use their shared key K x,y to defend against these two types of attacks.
Keying protocols for sensor networks
A keying protocol for a sensor network is a scheme for assigning a unique symmetric key K x,y to each pair of distinct sensors x and y in the network. Each symmetric key K x,y , that is assigned by the keying protocol, becomes known only to sensors x and y (and not to any other sensor in the network) before the network is deployed and before the adjacent sensors in the deployed network start to communicate with one another.
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It follows from this discussion that if a sensor network has at most n sensors, then each sensor in the network needs to know at most (n − 1) distinct symmetric keys -one key K x,y for every other sensor y in the network -before the network is deployed. There are two ways for a sensor x to know a symmetric key K x,y (before the network is deployed):
Sensor x stores a constant kx that it can use to compute key K x,y as follows:
where F is a public function that is known to every sensor in the network iy is the identity of sensor y kx is a constant that is stored in sensor x.
The cost of a keying protocol for a sensor network is measured by the number of symmetric keys (say K x,y ) plus the number of constants (say kx) that this keying protocol requires every x to store before the network is deployed.
Note that the cost of the straightforward keying protocol, which requires that every sensor x stores (n − 1) symmetric keys (of the form K x,y ), where n is the upper bound on the number of sensors in the network, is (n − 1).
In this paper, we address the following question. Is there a keying protocol for a sensor network, whose cost is much less than (n − 1), where n is the upper bound on the number of sensors in the network? Our research ends up with the following two results.
(a) Efficiency:
There is a keying protocol, where each sensor shares a distinct symmetric key with every other sensor in the network, and whose cost is (n + 1)/2.
The cost of every keying protocol, where each sensor shares a distinct symmetric key with every other sensor in the network, is at least (n − 1)/2.
In the next section, we present a keying protocol whose cost is (n + 1)/2, which is half the cost of the straightforward keying protocol.
An efficient keying protocol
Let n denote an upper bound on the number of sensors in our network. Without loss of generality, we assume that n is an odd positive integer. Each sensor in the network has a unique identifier in the range 0 . . . n − 1. We use ix and iy to denote the identifiers of sensors x and y, respectively, in this network. Each two sensors, say sensors x and y, share a symmetric key denoted by K x,y or K y,x . Only the two sensors x and y know their shared key K x,y . And if sensors x and y ever become neighbors in the network, then they can use their shared symmetric key K x,y to perform two functions:
1. Mutual authentication: Sensor x authenticates sensor y, and sensor y authenticates sensor x. 2. Confidential data exchange: Encrypt and later decrypt all the exchanged data messages between x and y.
(Note that sensors x and y can become neighbors in the network in two occasions. First, the two sensors x and y could be mobile and their movements cause them to become adjacent to one another. Second, the two sensors could be stationary and they are deployed adjacent to one another.)
In the remainder of this section, we show that if the shared symmetric keys are designed to have a ''special structure'', then each sensor needs to store only (n + 1)/2 shared symmetric keys. But before we present the special structure of the shared keys, we need to introduce two new concepts: ''universal keys'' and ''an asymmetric relation, named below, over the sensor identifiers''. Each sensor x in the network stores a symmetric key, called the universal key of sensor x. The universal key of sensor x, denoted by ux, is known only to sensor x.
Let ix and iy be two distinct sensor identifiers. (Recall that both ix and iy are in the range 0 . . . n − 1, where n is the (odd) upper bound of the number of sensors in the sensor network.) Identifier ix is said to be below identifier iy iff exactly one of the following two conditions holds:
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The below relation is better explained by an example. Consider the case where n = 5. In this case, the sensor identifiers s are 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, and we have:
• Identifier 0 is below identifiers 1 and 2.
• Identifier 1 is below identifiers 2 and 3.
• Identifier 2 is below identifiers 3 and 4.
• Identifier 3 is below identifiers 4 and 0.
• Identifier 4 is below identifiers 0 and 1.
The next three theorems, concerning the below relation, are in order.
Theorem 1. For any two distinct sensor identifiers ix and iy, one of the following two statements is true.
1. ix is below iy.
iy is below ix.
Proof. Let ix and iy be any two distinct sensor identifiers. Thus, ix and iy are two distinct integers in the range 0 . . . (n − 1). Without loss of generality, assume that ix < iy. Because n is an odd integer, exactly one of the following two statements holds.
(
If statement (1) holds then ix is below iy. Otherwise statement (2) holds and iy is below ix.
Theorem 2. For each sensor identifier ix, the number of distinct sensor identifiers iy, where ix is below iy, is
Proof. Each of the following (n − 1)/2 sensor identifiers is below ix:
) mod n. Also, ix is below each of the following (n − 1)/2 sensor identifiers:
) mod n. Thus, the number of distinct sensor identifiers iy, where iy is below ix, is (n − 1)/2. Also, the number of distinct sensor identifiers iy, where ix is below iy, is (n − 1)/2.
Theorem 3. For each sensor identifier ix, the number of distinct sensor identifiers iy, where iy is below ix, is
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
The special structure of the symmetric key K x,y , in the case where ix is below iy, is defined as follows:
where H is a secure hash function | is the concatenation operator ix is the identifier of sensor x uy is the universal key of sensor y.
Note that in this case (where ix is below iy), the symmetric key K x,y needs to be stored in sensor x only since sensor y can compute this key (using H, |, ix, and uy) whenever it needs it.
Note also that in the other case, where iy is below ix, the special structure of the symmetric key K x,y is H(iy|ux). And in this case, K x,y needs to be stored in sensor y only since sensor x can compute this key whenever it needs it.
The correctness of this keying protocol follows from the next theorem. Proof. Assume that a sensor identifier ix is below a sensor identifier iy. By our keying protocol the symmetric key that is shared between sensors x and y, namely H(ix|uy), is stored in sensor x only. Moreover, because sensor y is the only one that knows the universal key uy, only sensor y can compute the key H(ix|uy).
The efficiency of the keying protocol follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 5.
Each sensor x stores one universal key ux and (n − 1)/2 symmetric keys K x,y for every sensor y, where ix is below iy.
Proof. According to the above keying protocol, each sensor x stores its universal key ux. Also, each sensor x stores the symmetric keys K x,y that sensor x shares with every sensor y where ix is below iy. From Theorem 2, there are (n − 1)/2 sensors y where ix is below iy. Therefore, each sensor x stores (n − 1)/2 symmetric keys. 
A mutual authentication protocol
Before the sensors are deployed in a network, each sensor x is supplied with the following items:
1. One distinct identifier ix in the range 0 . . . n − 1.
One universal key ux.
3. (n − 1)/2 symmetric keys K x,y = H(ix|uy) each of which is shared between sensor x and another sensor y, where ix is below iy.
After every sensor is supplied with these items, the sensors are deployed in random locations in the network. Now if two sensors x and y happen to become adjacent to one another, then these two sensors need to execute a mutual authentication protocol so that sensor x proves to sensor y that it is indeed sensor x and sensor y proves to sensor x that it is indeed sensor y.
The mutual authentication protocol consists of the following six steps.
Step 1: Sensor x selects a random nonce nx and sends a hello message that is received by sensor y.
x → y : hello(ix, nx).
Step 2: Sensor y selects a random nonce ny and sends a hello message that is received by sensor x.
x ← y : hello(iy, ny).
Step 3: Sensor x determines whether ix is below iy. Then it either fetches K x,y from its memory or computes it. Finally, sensor x sends a verify message to sensor y.
x → y : verify(ix, iy, H(ix|iy|ny|K x,y )).
Step 4: Sensor y determines whether iy is below ix. Then it either fetches K x,y from its memory or computes it. Finally, sensor y sends a verify message to sensor x.
x ← y : verify(iy, ix, H(iy|ix|nx|K x,y )). Step 5: Sensor x computes H(iy|ix|nx|K x,y ) and compares it with the received H(iy|ix|nx|K x,y ). If they are equal, then x
concludes that the sensor claiming to be sensor y is indeed sensor y. Otherwise, no conclusion can be reached.
Step 6: Sensor y computes H(ix|iy|ny|K x,y ) and compares it with the received H(ix|iy|ny|K x,y ). If they are equal, then y concludes that the sensor claiming to be sensor x is indeed sensor x. Otherwise, no conclusion can be reached.
Next, we describe how this mutual authentication protocol defends against two types of attacks, impersonation attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.
(1) Defending against impersonation attacks:
An impersonation attack by an adversary sensor z against the mutual authentication protocol can proceed as follows: 
.)).
Note that in this attack, sensor z impersonates sensor x as it executes the mutual authentication protocol with sensor y. Fortunately, the computed term H(. . .) in the last verify message is incorrect for two reasons:
1. z does not know K x,y . 2. z cannot replay an old verify message from x to y because the H in the replayed message does not have the correct nonce ny that was selected at random by sensor y in the second step of the protocol.
Thus, y cannot conclude that it is communicating with x and abandons the authentication protocol.
(2) Defending against Man-in-the-Middle attacks:
A Man-in-the-Middle attack by an adversary sensor z against the mutual authentication protocol can proceed as follows: Note that in this attack, sensor z acts as a perfect medium relaying each message that it receives from sensor x to sensor y, and relaying each message that it receives from sensor y to sensor x. But in this case, the authentication protocol succeeds as it should, and the adversary sensor z does not gain any advantage by launching this attack.
A data exchange protocol
After two adjacent sensors x and y have authenticated one another using the mutual authentication protocol described in the previous section, sensors x and y can now start exchanging data messages according to the following data exchange protocol. (Recall that nx and ny are the two nonces that were selected at random by sensors x and y, respectively, in the mutual authentication protocol.)
Step 1: Sensor x concatenates the nonce ny with the text of the data message to be sent, encrypts the concatenation using the symmetric key K x,y , and sends the result in a data message to sensor y.
x → y : data(ix, iy, K x,y (ny|text)).
Step 2: Sensor y concatenates the nonce nx with the text of the data message to be sent, encrypts the concatenation using the symmetric key K x,y , and sends the result in a data message to sensor x.
x ← y : data(iy, ix, K x,y (nx|text)).
Sensors x and y can repeat Steps 1 and 2 any number of times to exchange data between themselves. Next, we describe how this data exchange protocol defends against two types of attacks, eavesdropping attacks and replay attacks.
(1) Defending against eavesdropping attacks: An eavesdropping attack by an adversary sensor z against the data exchange protocol can proceed as follows:
In this attack, sensor z eavesdrops on the communication between x and y. However, sensor z cannot understand the text of the messages between x and y because this text is encrypted by using K x,y shared only between x and y.
(2) Defending against replay attacks: A replay attack by an adversary sensor z against the data exchange protocol can proceed as follows:
In this attack, the adversary sensor z waits until a new session, identified by the pair of nonces (nx, ny), is established between sensors x and y. Then sensor z starts to replay old data messages that were sent in an earlier session, identified by the pair of nonces (nx, ny), between x and y. But the replayed messages will be discarded, and the attack will fail, because the intended receivers of the messages expect to find nx or ny, instead of nx or ny, in these messages.
Optimality of our keying protocol
According to our keying protocol, described in Section 4, each sensor in the network is required to store only (n + 1)/2 keys. Thus, the total number of keys that need to be stored in the sensor network is n(n + 1)/2. (This is much better than storing n(n − 1) keys in the sensor network as dictated by the straightforward keying protocol.)
Despite the big saving in storage, that is achieved by our keying protocol, one wonders ''Is there another keying protocol that requires the network to store much less than n(n + 1)/2 keys''? The following theorem indicates that the answer to this question is ''No''.
Theorem 6. Each keying protocol, that is collusion-proof, requires the sensor network to store at least n(n − 1)/2 keys.
Proof. In order for a keying protocol to be collusion-proof, the sensor network needs to have n(n − 1)/2 distinct symmetric keys. Thus, to prove that this theorem holds, it is sufficient to prove that every one of those symmetric keys, say K x,y , causes a distinct key to be stored in sensor x or in sensor y. We carry out this proof by contradiction.
Assume that some symmetric key K x,y does not cause a distinct key to be stored either in sensor x or in sensor y. In this case, sensor x stores a key kx that x can use to compute at least two symmetric shared keys K x,y and K w,x as follows.
where F is a well-known function that can be used by each sensor to compute its shared keys from its stored keys.
Similarly, sensor y stores a key ky that y can use to compute at least two symmetric shared keys K x,y and K y,z as follows.
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From (1) and (3), we have
Sensor x should not be allowed to utilize (5) and deduce key ky (in order that x be prevented from computing the shared key K y,z ). Therefore, there should not be any effectively computable function F ′ , such that
Similarly, sensor y should not be allowed to utilize (5) and deduce key kx (in order that y be prevented from computing the shared key K w,x ). Therefore, there should not be any effectively computable function F ′′ , such that
From (6) and (7), we conclude the following.
(i) Because there is no effectively computable function F ′ that satisfies (6), there is no effective way to compute key ky in sensor y from key kx in sensor x before the two sensors x and y are deployed in the network.
(ii) Because there is no effectively computable function F ′′ that satisfies (7), there is no effective way to compute key kx in sensor x from key ky in sensor y before the two sensors x and y are deployed in the network.
From (i) and (ii), we conclude that the two secrets kx and ky cannot be computed and stored in sensors x and y respectively before these two sensors are deployed in the network. Contradiction! A keying protocol is called uniform iff this protocol requires each sensor in the network to store the same number of keys. Notice that the keying protocol described in Section 4 is uniform. Notice also that the next theorem, concerning uniform keying protocols, follows from Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. Each uniform keying protocol requires each sensor in the network to store at least (n − 1)/2 keys.
From Theorem 7, our keying protocol requires each process to store no more than one key beyond the number of keys that need to be stored in each process by the best uniform keying protocol. Thus, for all practical purposes, our protocol is the best uniform keying protocol for sensor networks.
Sensor roles
There are two problems with our keying protocol, described in Section 4, of sensor networks.
1. This keying protocol requires that each sensor in the network stores (n + 1)/2 symmetric keys, where n is an upper bound on the number of sensors in the network. Unfortunately, this number of symmetric keys (to be stored in each sensors), is still large in those cases when n is large. To make matters worse, we also showed that no keying protocol can require each sensor to store less than (n + 1)/2 symmetric keys. (Luckily, this negative result depends on the fact that the architecture of the sensor network is as described in Section 2. And we show in this section that if the network architecture is changed from that described in Section 2, one can design a keying protocol for the sensor network where each sensor is required to store much less than (n + 1)/2 symmetric keys.) 2. If a sensor network, where each sensor stores (n + 1)/2 keys, is deployed, and if later the number of sensors in the network to be increased beyond the upper bound n, the keys that are already stored in each deployed sensor need to be changed.
To solve these two problems, we introduce the concept of a ''sensor role'' as follows. Each sensor in a sensor network has a role. The role of a sensor can describe the task that this sensor performs (e.g. sensing temperature or sensing motion). It can also describe the general location of the sensor (e.g. the second floor or the third floor of the building being sensed).
Many sensors in a sensor network can have the same role in order to provide fault-tolerance and accurate sensing. For example, a sensor network can have some fifty sensors whose role is to sense temperature in the third floor of the building being sensed. These sensors can provide fault-tolerance and accurate sensing of the temperature in the third floor of the building.
If follows from this discussion that an upper bound m on the number of distinct roles in the network is relatively small whereas an upper bound n on the number of sensors in the same network is relatively large. Now, the symmetric keys, in a sensor network whose sensors have roles, can be modified as follows. For every two roles f and g in the network, the network has a distinct symmetric key K f ,g . Only sensors, whose role is f or g, know K f ,g and no other sensor in the network knows K f ,g .
To realize the symmetric keys K f ,g , we modify the above keying protocol as follows. ii. Each sensor whose role is f has a universal key uf (this means that all sensors, whose role is f , have the same universal key uf .) iii. For any two roles f and g, the symmetric key K f ,g is computed as follows (depending on whether if is below ig, or ig is below if , or if = ig).
Case 1. (if is below ig):
In this case, every sensor whose role is if stores K f ,g and every sensor whose role is ig computes K f ,g . Case 2. (ig is below if ):
In this case, every sensor whose role is ig stores K f ,g and every sensor whose role is if computes K f ,g . In this case, every sensor whose role is if computes K f ,f .
Therefore, every sensor in the network, where sensors have roles, stores (m + 1)/2 symmetric keys, where m is an upper bound on the number of roles in the network.
Concluding remarks
Typically, each sensor in a sensor network with n sensors needs to store n − 1 shared distinct (in order to ensure that the keying protocol is collusion-proof) symmetric keys to communicate securely with each other. Thus, the number of shared symmetric keys stored in the sensor network is n(n − 1). However, the optimal number of shared symmetric keys for secure communication, theoretically, is  n 2  = n(n − 1)/2. Although there have been many approaches that attempt to reduce the number of shared symmetric keys, they lead to a loss of security: they are all vulnerable to collusion. In this paper, we show the best keying protocol for sensor networks, that needs to store only (n + 1)/2 shared symmetric keys to each sensor. The number of shared symmetric keys stored in a sensor network with n sensors is n(n + 1)/2, which is close to the optimal number of shared symmetric keys for any key distribution scheme that is not vulnerable to collusion. It may be noted that in addition to the low number of keys stored, and the ability to resist collusion between sensors, our keying protocol has two further advantages. Firstly, it is uniform: we store the same number of keys in each sensor. Secondly, it is computationally cheap, and thus suitable for a low-power computer such as a sensor: when two sensors are adjacent to each other, the computation of a shared symmetric key requires only hashing, which is a cheap computation and can be done fast. As our protocol has many desirable properties, such as efficiency, uniformity and security, we call this protocol the best keying protocol for sensor networks.
